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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, school violence has repeatedly shocked the immediately affected communities and the entire country. While the shootings at Columbine High School and Virginia Tech represent the tragic
extreme of school violence, increasing numbers of other criminal
acts—including sexual assault, weapons possession, and drug-related ac1
tivity—are occurring on high school and college campuses. As violence and allegations of crime rise in schools, so too do the number of
proceedings in which institutions attempt to discipline the perpetrators.
Such proceedings present a unique legal dilemma. A student
faces a number of consequences and challenges when accused of
conduct in violation of both criminal law and school policy. Say a student at a publicly funded university sells illegal drugs on campus: of
course selling drugs violates criminal law. But many universities have
also enacted student codes that impose disciplinary sanctions on stu2
dents who sell drugs.
If a student wants to remain enrolled and continue attending
school, he may participate in a school disciplinary proceeding, which
1

See Alexander M. Kipnis, Gideon’s Trumpet and the New Millennium: In
Defense of Right to Counsel in Student Disciplinary Proceedings in Institutions of
Higher Education 4 (Apr. 30, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931332 (articulating three areas of the
law—sexual assault, drug use, and ownership of intellectual property—affecting student discipline at higher learning institutions).
2
See, e.g., Policy Regarding Use of Illegal Drugs and Alcohol, U. IOWA, http://
dos.uiowa.edu/policy-list/current-policies-and-regulations-affecting-students2011-2012-academic-year/student-responsibilities-6/policy-regarding-use-of-illegal-drugsand-alcohol-4 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (“Illegal drug trafficking is viewed as a clear
and present danger to the University community. Any student found to have sold,
manufactured, distributed, or administered illegal drugs may be suspended or expelled.”
(emphasis added)).
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may occur well before the criminal case has concluded. At the proceeding, a disciplinary panel will ask questions of the student and other witnesses to determine whether the alleged conduct actually occurred.
At this proceeding, one of two things could happen. The student
could refuse to answer the questions, because he does not know what
facts will incriminate him in his later criminal drug case. If he refuses,
however, he may face suspension or expulsion on the basis of the testimony of the witnesses against him. Alternatively, the student, wishing to put the events behind him, could testify, admit to selling drugs,
and receive a disciplinary sanction. Subsequently, he would stand trial
in the criminal case, where his statements from the school disciplinary
3
hearing can be introduced into evidence against him.
With parallel proceedings—one criminal and one administrative—arising from the same set of facts, the student has conflicting interests and faces procedural obstacles in both. The dilemma is further
complicated without the assistance or advice of trained legal counsel
to warn the student of adverse legal consequences and recommend
how best to proceed. Admittedly, a school disciplinary proceeding
does not threaten a student’s liberty in the same way a criminal proceeding does. But when a student faces this type of situation, he is
forced to make decisions and meet challenges—including confusing
legal questions concerning self-incrimination, admissibility of evidence, and confrontation of witnesses—that he is ill-equipped to handle without the advice of legal counsel.
The utility of a student’s right to counsel in the above situation is
obvious; however, entitlement to this right is not. A student is entitled
to counsel, appointed by the court if he or she is indigent, in the criminal proceeding if he or she faces potential incarceration. But school
disciplinary actions are civil proceedings. Thus under current Supreme Court Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, a person has no right
4
to appointed counsel unless he faces potential imprisonment.
Fortunately, the Sixth Amendment is not the only route to securing a student’s right to counsel. Students in public schools and universities are entitled to minimal procedural due process before they

3

These statements would likely be admissible nonhearsay statements as they are
admissions of a party-opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) or similar
state evidence rules. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (declaring that statements made by
party-opponents are not hearsay).
4
See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (holding that a sentence of imprisonment cannot be imposed without access to the assistance of counsel).
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5

can be suspended or expelled from school. This Comment concludes that when a student faces both a disciplinary hearing and a potential criminal incarceration, an analysis of the interests at stake indicates that Fourteenth Amendment due process protection entitles a
student to the assistance of counsel in both proceedings.
The Supreme Court decided two cases in the last Term that are
related to the right to counsel in school disciplinary hearings. In
Turner v. Rogers, the Supreme Court addressed a situation in which a
father in a custody dispute was incarcerated for civil contempt because
6
he failed to pay his court-mandated child support. The Court determined that while counsel was not strictly necessary, alternative procedural safeguards are required before an indigent parent can be incar7
cerated for contempt. In a case coming out of the public schools,
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, a seventh-grade student was pulled out of class
by a uniformed police officer and questioned without a Miranda warning at school about home break-ins that had occurred in his neigh8
borhood. Juvenile criminal charges followed this interrogation, and
the Court addressed whether Miranda warnings were necessary due to
9
the age of the suspect. The Court concluded that age should be a factor in determining whether a child is in custody, and thus requires the
10
Miranda warnings before questioning. Attorney Ken Schmetter, author of the American Bar Association’s brief in the case, characterized
11
the J.D.B. decision as a “very significant decision for kids.” The Court,
the Washington Post reported, recognized that “children are more easily
coerced and impulsive than adults, less likely to foresee the implications
12
of their actions and more likely to make false confessions.” Despite
establishing important procedural safeguards in civil cases and recog5

See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (“Students facing temporary suspension have interests qualifying for protection of the Due Process Clause . . . .”); E.K. v.
Stamford Bd. of Ed., 557 F. Supp. 2d 272, 276 (D. Conn. 2008) (“The parties do not
dispute that plaintiff has the right to procedural due process in connection with his
expulsion from school, and that constitutional compliance requires at least notice and
opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” (citing Goss, 419 U.S.
at 574-79)).
6
Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
7
Id. at 2519-20.
8
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011).
9
Id. at 2400-01.
10
See id. at 2406 (“This is not to say that a child’s age will be a determinative, or
even significant, factor in every case.”).
11
Donna St. George, Miranda-Rights Debate Unfolds at Fairfax School, WASH. POST,
July 18, 2011, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
12
Id.
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nizing the vulnerability of children accused of misconduct at school,
these two cases hardly guarantee any procedural protections for a student in the situation this Comment considers.
This Comment will analyze the issues of school disciplinary due
process and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and their intersection in this factual situation—an instance where a student simultaneously faces academic and criminal penalties in parallel proceedings.
13
Though infrequently addressed in litigation, this is an important topic that concerns countless students in public schools and universities
across the country. Several scholars have analyzed due process rights
in school disciplinary cases and have discussed how schools and courts
14
should address these rights. The evaluation of the right to counsel
in a disciplinary hearing, however, has remained one discrete issue
among many in current scholarship. Thus, the scope of this Comment is limited to evaluating the particular situation of a student facing both criminal and disciplinary charges arising from the same
event and looks only at the role of and right to counsel in that particular situation. In seeking to find a constitutional right to counsel for
these students, I will explore the various obstacles to obtaining that
right in constitutional provisions and interpretations.
Part I explains the theory behind and requirements of procedural
due process in school disciplinary proceedings and how courts have
previously addressed the right to counsel in these proceedings. Part II
examines the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The intersection of school disciplinary hearings and
the right to counsel is analyzed in Part III, which asks whether the
Sixth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees this
right. I ultimately conclude that an application of the factors from
13

There are several possible explanations for the paucity of cases addressing counsel in disciplinary hearings. First, students and parents may not be aware of their due
process rights when a student is expelled or suspended from school. If they are aware
of such rights, then they may not believe that these rights include the assistance of
counsel. Second, even if parents and students think counsel would be useful, they may
lack the financial resources to secure such counsel. Along those same lines, poorer
families likely fail to file a lawsuit to assert their due process rights precisely because
they lack the financial means to assert their rights in a civil lawsuit. Finally, when parents or students make a valid claim that the student needs counsel, it is possible that
the parties settle the matter privately before resorting to the courts.
14
See, e.g., Curtis J. Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the University Student, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 289, 339 (1999) (recognizing that no
school offers to find a student an attorney or pay for counsel if the student cannot afford one, in part because courts have rarely viewed due process in school disciplinary
hearings as including a right to counsel).

MOSSMAN_REVISED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

590

12/10/2011 9:44 AM

[Vol. 160: 585

15

Mathews v. Eldridge compels the conclusion that the Fourteenth
Amendment entitles a student to counsel in this situation.
Finally, in Part IV, I explore persuasive extra-constitutional reasons for
affording a right to counsel, along with some of the arguments against
affording the right.
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of education
16
and the severe consequences that can occur when it is taken away.
The Court has also recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright, the seminal
case guaranteeing appointed counsel, that “lawyers in criminal courts
17
are necessities, not luxuries.” Given the dangers of action without
counsel in a disciplinary proceeding where both expulsion and criminal imprisonment are possible outcomes, lawyers in school disciplinary hearings are no more of a luxury.
I. SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. Rise of Procedural Due Process Protections in Schools
Arising out of the civil rights movement, procedural due process
protection in school settings has developed into a flexible doctrine
highly dependent on the specific facts involved. The decisive appellate
case that laid the groundwork for Supreme Court–mandated due pro18
cess is Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education. The plaintiffs in Dixon were six black college students who in Montgomery, Alabama, in
19
1960 entered a lunchroom and demanded to be served. After their
actions attracted the attention of the Governor and the Chairman of
the State Board of Education, the Board of Education voted unani20
mously to expel the plaintiffs. The students faced no formal charges
21
and the school did not hold a hearing prior to their expulsion.

15

See 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (holding that to determine what process is required, the private interest must be weighed against the government’s interest and the
risk of erroneous deprivation as well as the value of additional procedure).
16
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975) (emphasizing that charges of misconduct could damage a student’s reputation in school and interfere with future employment and educational opportunities).
17
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
18
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); see also Goss, 419 U.S. at 576 n.8 (describing Dixon
as a “landmark decision”).
19
Dixon, 294 F.2d at 152 n.3.
20
Id. at 154.
21
Id.
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In this landmark decision, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the gravity
22
of expulsion as a punishment. The court held that “due process requires notice and some opportunity for hearing before a student at a
23
tax-supported college is expelled for misconduct.”
Although the
holding was limited, the court offered guidance for future proceed24
ings. Emphasizing that the nature of a hearing varies with the facts
of each case, the court explained that a charge of misconduct differs
from academic failure because a disciplinary board’s findings depend
on facts and testimony “easily colored by the point of view of the wit25
ness.” A hearing is therefore necessary to allow the decisionmaker to
26
hear both sides of any given case. Though emphasizing that a “fulldress judicial hearing” is unnecessary, the court declared that the “ru27
diments of an adversary proceeding” should be presented. In the
case before the court, it was necessary for the student to be given the
names of the witnesses, a report of their testimony, and the opportunity
28
to present a defense, including the student’s own witnesses.
Dixon represents a shift in school disciplinary due process developments
because the court recognized that unilateral action by a school disciplinary committee necessarily violates a student’s right to due process.
Dixon, though not Supreme Court precedent, allowed other courts
the opportunity to follow its logic in cases involving public higher education. Decisions after Dixon paved the way for enhanced procedural
29
protections in school disciplinary proceedings. But Dixon’s applica30
bility to secondary school cases remained in doubt.
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided In re Gault, establishing due
process rights for juveniles before being committed to a juvenile
31
home. Though not directly applicable to school disciplinary situa22

See id. at 157 (“Indeed, expulsion may well prejudice the student in completing
his education at any other institution. Surely no one can question that the right to
remain at the college in which the plaintiffs were students in good standing is an interest of extremely great value.”).
23
Id. at 158.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 158-59.
26
Id. at 159.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
See, e.g., Due v. Fla. Agric. & Mech. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 401-02 (N.D.
Fla. 1963).
30
See RICHARD S. VACCA & WILLIAM C. BOSHER, JR., LAW AND EDUCATION: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND COURT DECISIONS 218 (7th ed. 2008) (“The question of the applicability of Dixon to the elementary school setting was not answered for several years.”).
31
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
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tions, Gault implicitly encouraged lower courts to embrace the idea
that due process rights attach to juveniles in public elementary and
32
secondary schools. In Goss v. Lopez in 1975, the Supreme Court specifically addressed due process rights for students in disciplinary hearings. Though directly presenting the question lower courts had grap33
pled with since Dixon, Goss did not provide solid direction to courts
addressing disciplinary due process issues. Instead, the Court emphasized that determining whether due process is fulfilled depends upon
34
the specific charges and sanctions involved.
In Goss, nine students who were suspended from school for ten
35
days denied their alleged misconduct. The Supreme Court found
36
they had both a liberty and a property interest in their education.
The Court held, concerning a suspension of less than ten days, that a
student must be given oral or written notice of the charges, a summary
of the evidence against him, and a chance to present his own version
37
of the events. The Court then went to great lengths to limit the
38
holding to only short suspensions. It also explained that the required
32

See VACCA & BOSHER, supra note 30, at 219 (“Gault did not apply specifically to
school exclusions, but a number of lower courts began to clarify the procedural due
process rights of students in exclusionary hearings.”).
33
See, e.g., Marin v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974) (holding
that a number of procedural rights, including notice of charges, a hearing, and a written decision of the findings are necessary, based in part on Dixon); Givens v. Poe, 346
F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (citing Dixon for its procedural safeguards because
the Supreme Court “has written no blueprint”); Rumler v. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 327 F.
Supp. 729, 743 (D.S.C. 1971) (“On comparison, however, of Dixon and the case under
consideration, the facts are so entirely different as to deny that Dixon would warrant
relief to plaintiffs or censure of defendants in the manner in which a simple suspension
was involved.”); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 177 (M.D. Tenn. 1961)
(“While there are factual differences between the Dixon case and the present one, and
the principles enunciated so clearly therein are not necessarily determinative of this
case, they are entitled to considerable weight insofar as the question of procedural due
process is concerned.”(italics added)).
34
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (emphasizing that the decision was
confined only to short suspensions and that other punishments, or special situations,
may require more formal procedures).
35
Id. at 568-69.
36
See id. at 574 (“Having chosen to extend the right to an education to people of
appellees’ class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has
occurred.” (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the result in part); id. at 171 (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 206 (Marshall, J., dissenting))).
37
Id. at 581.
38
Id. at 584 (“Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school
term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures.”).
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procedures represented a floor rather than a ceiling that a “fair-minded
39
school principal” would impose to avoid unfair suspensions.
The
Court expressly noted that it did not interpret due process to require
counsel, cross-examination, or the opportunity to call witnesses for
40
hearings potentially leading to short suspensions.
The procedures
mandated in Goss amounted to little more than an “informal give-andtake between student and disciplinarian” to guard against erroneous
41
adverse action.
Since Goss, the Court has not addressed due process in school disciplinary proceedings, leaving the interpretation and implementation
42
of Goss, and later Mathews v. Eldridge, to the lower courts. The Court
was again invited to address the procedural due process rights of stu43
dents in Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz.
There, the Court decided less stringent procedures were necessary for
44
academic dismissals than for disciplinary decisions. In an academic
dismissal, the Court reasoned, school administrators rely upon their
judgment and experience as academics in deciding whether a student
45
can and should continue his or her studies. Conversely, in a disciplinary hearing, the facts of the infraction must be determined by
46
weighing the credibility of the student against that of his accuser. In
addressing the academic dismissal in Horowitz, the Court took the opportunity to emphasize that due process depends on the specific situa47
48
tion at hand and the risks of encroaching on academic discretion.

39

Id. at 583.
Id.
41
Id. at 584.
42
After Goss, the Court held that a student could sue school board members for
denial of procedural due process in an expulsion hearing. See Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975) (holding that school officials who knowingly violate students’
constitutional rights are not immune from liability).
43
435 U.S. 78 (1978).
44
Id. at 89-90.
45
See id. at 90 (“[T]he determination whether to dismiss a student for academic
reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily
adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.”).
46
See Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 641 (6th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging the necessity of a more complete hearing when credibility is at issue).
47
See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 86 (“The need for flexibility is well illustrated by the
significant difference between the failure of a student to meet academic standards and
the violation by a student of valid rules of conduct.”).
48
See id. at 90 (“We decline to further enlarge the judicial presence in the academic community and thereby risk deterioration of many beneficial aspects of the facultystudent relationship.”).
40
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One final Supreme Court case has proved integral to lower courts’
determination of the essential elements of due process in a hearing.
Though not specifically addressing school disciplinary proceedings,
Mathews v. Eldridge provides a rubric for assessing the procedures nec49
essary to uphold constitutional procedural due process. The Court
in Mathews held that to determine the requirements of due process, a
50
court must weigh: (1) the private interest involved, (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of the private interest through the procedures
used and the benefit, if any, that additional procedure would add, and
(3) the government’s interest, including fiscal and administrative
51
burdens caused by additional procedure. With the limited guidance
of Goss and Mathews, lower courts and schools set to work determining
the required elements of due process in individual circumstances.
In 1979, a doctoral student at Northwestern University studied
three public and three private secondary schools to analyze their re52
spective reactions to the Goss decision.
The study demonstrated
Goss’s substantial effect on disciplinary procedures and highlighted
differences between public and private school suspension and expul53
sion procedures. At the public schools, administrators exhibited a
high level of awareness of the Goss decision, and two of the three
schools formally modified their disciplinary procedures to comply
54
with due process.
Although administrators at the private schools

49

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), concerned the procedure necessary
before termination of Social Security disability benefits. Distinguishing the requirement of an evidentiary hearing requirement from Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1974), the Court in Mathews found that the procedures given before revoking benefits
were sufficient to meet the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 424 U.S. at
340-41.
50
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill, the procedure required to satisfy due process is a constitutional question
that can only be determined by a court. See 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (highlighting the
fact that state statutes do not determine the appropriate minimal procedures when
constitutional due process applies).
51
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
52
See Cynthia Ann Kelly, Due Process in the Schools: The View from Inside 1-2
( J une 1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with
the author) (detailing the methodology, research, and results of the study).
53
See, e.g., id. at 255 tbl.29 (comparing due process rankings across various levels
of formalized schools).
54
See id. at 238-39 (detailing the awareness of teachers and administrators of the Goss
decision, due process generally, and the changes in procedures). Notably, the study
found that in the third public school, though administrators were aware of the Goss decision, they avoided reforms by instituting a “blocking” punishment in lieu of suspension,
which disallowed students from attending school unless accompanied by a parent. Id. at
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55

were undoubtedly aware of the Goss decision, the disciplinary procedures at these schools were more informal and continued to be so af56
ter Goss. The study also found that despite general awareness of the
57
Goss decision, its implementation in the schools was limited. Only
one school adopted official guidelines and none went beyond the deci58
sion to address other hearing elements. This study reflects the fact
that the reactions to the Goss decision in the schools closely paralleled
that in the courts: an understanding that due process required something, but confusion and variance in how due process should actually
be implemented in school procedures and individual cases.
As Mathews, Goss, and Horowitz emphasize, the necessary elements
of a hearing vary greatly depending on the circumstances and interests involved. The necessary elements of a hearing may include: notice, an impartial decisionmaker, an opportunity for the student to
present his or her side of the story, including presentation of witnesses
and evidence, an opportunity to challenge adverse witnesses and evidence, the right to an attorney, and a decision based on the record
59
available with a statement of its rationale. While the Supreme Court
explicitly required few hearing elements apart from notice and an op60
portunity to be heard, some of the more frequently litigated elements
include the opportunity to cross-examine, the right to call witnesses, the
61
impartiality of the tribunal, and the right to counsel. The struggle
238. The study noted that “blocking” without procedures likely violated Goss as well, because it deprived students of their right, at least temporarily, to education. Id.
55
See id. at 239 (“An examination of suspension procedures at the three private
schools in the study provides further evidence of the impact of the Goss decision.”).
56
See id. at 239-40 (explaining that though the private schools attempted to
fairly enforce rules, they determined fairness independently, not in reaction to
court-made rules).
57
See id. at 264 (“While the public schools have made some steps toward recognizing students’ due process rights, there have been no giant leaps.”).
58
The study looked at rights including “notice, hearing, right to an impartial
decisionmaker, rights to confrontation, the right to call witnesses and the right to
appeal.” Id. at 265.
59
See AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 521 (Kern Alexander & M. David Alexander
eds., 7th ed. 2009) (setting forth seven essential elements of a Mathews hearing
adapted to an educational setting). Some courts and states also include the right to
appeal as an element of due process, but it is not generally considered essential if an
otherwise fair proceeding was conducted. See VACCA & BOSHER, supra note 30, at 222
(explaining that many states give students some way to appeal, either through the Department of Education or directly to the courts).
60
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (requiring “oral or written notice of
the charges”).
61
See VACCA & BOSHER, supra note 30, at 220-22 (listing the elements of a hearing
and noting which elements are more frequently contested in court).
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over these more contested hearing elements demonstrates the tension
between preventing disciplinary hearings from becoming too adver62
63
sarial and ensuring that adverse actions are not taken erroneously.
B. The Approach of Codes and Courts to the Right
to Counsel in Disciplinary Hearings
The right to counsel, as well as other criminal procedure protec64
tions, comes into question when a student faces both disciplinary
and criminal charges deriving from the same set of events. The inquiry into a student’s right to counsel in a disciplinary hearing begins
with the question of whether the applicable school code addresses
counsel at all, forbids it, or allows it. Where either codes or administrators forbid meaningful participation of counsel, courts face a dilemma. On the one hand, allowing counsel to participate in disciplinary hearings could make the hearing more adversarial. On the other
hand, denying a student’s right to counsel threatens the student’s
constitutional due process rights.
1. A Brief Survey of Disciplinary Codes
Understandably, disciplinary codes vary significantly among different schools. Because public schools must comply with due process,
their school codes are often more comprehensive and conclusive con65
cerning hearing rights.
On the other hand, a number of private
schools also afford significant procedural protections. Many colleges
62

See Richard Arum & Doreet Preiss, Still Judging School Discipline (citing judicial
concern about the increasingly adversarial nature of challenging school authority), in
FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 238, 239 ( J oshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009).
63
See Goss, 419 U.S. at 576 (emphasizing the importance of an education and the
adverse consequences a student faces after disciplinary action based on misconduct).
64
Courts have uniformly held that rights against self-incrimination and double
jeopardy do not apply to disciplinary proceedings. See Paine v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Tex. Sys., 355 F. Supp 199, 203 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (concluding that because a
school disciplinary sanction is administrative, not punitive, and the Double Jeopardy
Clause applies only to two successive punitive sanctions, disciplinary sanctions on top
of criminal punishment do not violate double jeopardy), aff’d, 474 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir.
1973); VACCA & BOSHER, supra note 30, at 222 (“The fifth amendment protection
against self-incrimination does not apply to school disciplinary proceedings; it applies
only to criminal proceedings.”). However, the privilege against self-incrimination and
use of a student’s statements from a disciplinary hearing in a criminal proceeding constitute a strong argument for allowing students counsel in disciplinary proceedings so
that they can preserve their rights in the criminal proceeding.
65
See supra notes 54- 56 and accompanying text.
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and universities permit some representation in disciplinary hearings,
although the extent and formality of this representation varies from
66
school to school. The variation among secondary public schools is
even greater. While this Section primarily focuses on university codes,
which are generally more fully developed and widely available, the
end of this Section delves briefly into public secondary school codes.
A common code formulation allowing assistance during a disciplinary proceeding permits a student to consult with an advisor before
67
and during the proceeding. Universities employing this provision
vary on whether the advisors can participate or can be attorneys.
Princeton University and Colgate University, both private, insist that
the advisor be a member of the university community, effectively precluding participation by an attorney at Princeton and explicitly doing
68
so at Colgate. Temple University, a publicly funded institution, al-

66

See Jason J. Bach, Students Have Rights, Too: The Drafting of Student Conduct Codes,
2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 23 (stating that while colleges vary in the extent of assistance
of counsel provided, most allow some assistance).
67
See, e.g., COLGATE UNIV., STUDENT HANDBOOK 2011–2012, at 150 (2011), available at http://www.colgate.edu/portaldata/imagegallerywww/939d3f45-4876-4ef5-b5671082dd4c58e4/ImageGallery/Studenthandbook2011.pdf (providing that a student
whose behavior is in question has a right “to the assistance of an advisor at the hearing”); TEMPLE UNIV. BOARD OF TRS, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 11 (2009),
available at http://policies.temple.edu/getdoc.asp?policy_no=03.70.12 (“[T]he Accused Student ha[s] the right to be assisted by any advisor they choose, at their own
expense.”); UNIV. OF WIS. SYS., STUDENT NONACADEMIC DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
§ 17.12(4)(b), at 47 (2009), available at http://www3.uwstout.edu/stusrv/dean/
upload/uws017.pdf (“The student shall have the right . . . to be accompanied by an
advisor of the student’s choice.”); Board of Trustees Bylaws, CITY U. N.Y., http://
policy.cuny.edu/text/toc/btb/Article%20XV/Section%2015.3. (last visited Nov. 15,
2011) (“The notice shall contain . . . [a] statement that the student [has a right] . . . to
be represented by legal counsel or an advisor at the student’s expense.”); Judicial
Procedure for Alleged Violations of the Code of Student Life (2010–2011 Academic Year), U.
IOWA, http://dos.uiowa.edu/policy-list/archives/2010-2011-policies-and-regulationsaffecting-students-archived/student-responsibilities-5/judicial-procedures-2/judicialprocedure-for-alleged-violations-of-the-code-of-student-life-6/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2011)
[hereinafter Violations of Student Code] (stating that at a formal hearing a student has the
right to be represented by an adviser at the student’s expense); Rights, Rules, Responsibilities, University-wide Regulations, PRINCETON U., http://www.princeton.edu/pub/rrr/
part1/index.xml#comp18 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (“Each party to the case may be
accompanied by an adviser from within the university community.”).
68
See COLGATE UNIV., supra note 67, at 150 (“An advisor must be chosen from
among current students, faculty, staff or administrators at Colgate University. The
advisor may not be a practicing attorney, and no practicing attorney may be present in
the hearing room.”); Rights, Rules, Responsibilities, Students and the University, PRINCETON
U., http://www.princeton.edu/pub/rrr/part2/index.xml#comp25 (last visited Nov.
15, 2011) (requiring that the advisor “must be a current member of the resident University community”).
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lows the student to have an advisor present at the hearing, and allows
the advisor to be an attorney; however, the advisor may not actively
69
participate in the hearing.
The University of Iowa, also publicly
funded, does not place any limits on the representation by an advi70
sor. The City University of New York and the University of Wisconsin
system—both publicly funded—allow an advisor or legal counsel to
71
represent the student. The publicly funded University of New Mexico gives the responsibility of presenting a case to the student alone,
stating that “advisors (including attorney advisors) are therefore not
permitted to present arguments or evidence or otherwise participate
72
directly in the hearing.”
The ability of a student to retain an advisor or attorney varies
greatly between universities, but the differences are even more pronounced among the multitude of independent elementary and secondary school districts throughout the United States. Public high
schools, perhaps motivated by widely publicized tragedies like Columbine, often have detailed internal policies for school emergencies
stemming from a student’s unlawful conduct, including securing the
situation, mounting an investigation, and notifying law enforcement
73
officials. Many public schools also have explicit rules prohibiting the
sale or possession of tobacco, drugs, or alcohol on campus, and penalizing violent and criminal acts—often classifying the acts according to
74
their severity and the disciplinary sanction involved. However, with
regard to disciplinary proceedings, suburban school codes tend to offer
less detailed guidance as compared to codes of sprawling urban districts

69

See TEMPLE UNIV., supra note 67, at 11 (“[A]dvisors are not permitted to speak
or to participate directly in any Student Conduct Board hearings.”).
70
See Violations of Student Code, supra note 67 (“The accused student also has a
right to bring an advisor (e.g., attorney, parent, support person) to this meeting.”).
71
Board of Trustees Bylaws, supra note 67; UNIV. OF WIS. SYS., supra note 67.
72
Student Grievance Procedure, U.N.M., http://pathfinder.unm.edu/policies.htm#
studentgrievance (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
73
See, e.g., LOWER MERION HIGH SCH., STUDENT/PARENT HANDBOOK 2011–2012,
at 42-43 (2011), available at http://www.lmsd.org/documents/schools/lmhs/student_
handbook.pdf (detailing specific types of prohibited behavior and the corresponding
disciplinary options and procedures).
74
See id. at 43 (classifying the most serious behaviors, including drug and weapons
possession and assault as “clearly criminal and . . . so serious that they always require
administrative action which may result in immediate removal of the student from
school and/or action by the Board of School Directors”); SCH. DIST. OF PHILA., 2010–
2011 CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT 10-11 (2010), available at www.phila.k12.pa.us/
offices/administration/policies/CodeofConduct_1011.pdf (defining major and minor
infractions, including criminal acts, and their consequences).
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75

more accustomed to disciplinary issues.
Suburban school district
codes less frequently address the specifics of the procedures a hearing
must include, instead only acknowledging that a student is entitled to a
76
“due process hearing” for more serious offenses.
More urbanized
school districts may have more detailed procedures addressing im77
portant elements of due process for long suspensions and expulsions.
The School District of Philadelphia, for example, specifically allows a
78
student to have retained counsel at an expulsion hearing.
Allowing an advisor to be present is an important step in protecting a student’s rights at a disciplinary hearing. Permitting the advisor
to be an attorney provides even better protections. However, when
codes are vague about who the advisor may be and whether they may
participate in the hearing, the value of allowing these advisors is diminished. Many in the academic community believe that counsel
79
should be provided, although only some schools follow suit. Furthermore, most courts have refused to enforce the requirement of
counsel in lawsuits alleging a violation of due process in academic dis-

75

A U.S. Department of Education study found that urban schools experience
more student behavior problems in some areas:
About half of the student behaviors studied were more likely to be worse
in public urban schools than in suburban or rural schools, even after accounting for the higher concentration of poverty in urban schools. More
time was spent maintaining classroom discipline in urban schools, and
student absenteeism, possession of weapons, and student pregnancy were
greater problems.
LAURA LIPPMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NCES 96-184, URBAN
SCHOOLS: THE CHALLENGE OF LOCATION AND POVERTY 108 (1996), available at http://
nces.ed.gov/pubs/96184all.pdf.
76
See LOWER MERION HIGH SCH., supra note 73, at 43 (“The student is entitled to a
due process hearing before the School Board if expulsion is recommended.”).
77
See, e.g., Donald H. Stone, Crime & Punishment in Public Schools: An Empirical
Study of Disciplinary Proceedings, 17 AM. J. OF TRIAL ADVOC. 351, 356 (1993) (reporting
that among thirty-five schools 44% of rural, 62.5% of suburban, and 53% of urban students involved in disciplinary hearings were not advised of their right to an attorney).
78
SCH. DIST. OF PHILA., supra note 74, at 14 (allowing a student facing expulsion
to be represented by counsel, to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses, and to
review records).
79
See Steven K. Berenson, What Should Law School Student Conduct Codes Do?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 803, 843 (2005) (“Nonetheless, most commentators suggest that [counsel]
be provided in the academic disciplinary context, and most law school codes presently
provide for such rights.” (citations omitted)); Berger & Berger supra note 14, at 339
(noting that fewer than 60% of university respondents to a survey about disciplinary
procedures allowed students to retain legal counsel).
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80

ciplinary proceedings. But in a disciplinary proceeding where the
student faces parallel criminal charges, the student should have affirmative representation by counsel regardless of whether an advisor is
81
allowed to be present. The student should be guaranteed this protection under the Constitution.
2. Courts’ Approach to the Right to Counsel in
Disciplinary Proceedings
Although some courts have suggested that students should have
82
limited assistance of counsel in certain situations, most have avoided
83
requiring counsel in routine student disciplinary hearings. Before
Goss, several lower courts found counsel to be necessary to afford due
84
process in a disciplinary hearing. But after Goss, courts have been
decidedly more reluctant to require counsel, presumably because Goss
mandated only minimal procedures: notice and an opportunity to be
85
heard. The notable exception to the post-Goss trend is Gabrilowitz v.
Newman, in which the First Circuit held that counsel was necessary for
the proceedings to comply with due process because of the parallel
86
criminal proceeding.
The student in Gabrilowitz was accused of assault with intent to
87
rape another student at the University of Rhode Island. Along with
pending criminal charges, the student received notice of disciplinary
charges stemming from the allegations, which also raised violations of

80

See Berenson, supra note 79, at 843 (“And while courts have divided over whether there is a right to counsel in academic disciplinary proceedings, most hold that
there is no such right.” (citations omitted)).
81
See Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1978) (requiring counsel to
caution a student against self-incrimination in school proceedings where the student faces parallel criminal charges).
82
Id.
83
See, e.g., Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 640-41 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding
counsel unnecessary at the disciplinary hearing given the additional administrative burden on the school); Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 74-75 (4th Cir.
1983) (holding that disciplinary proceedings in which the student lacked the assistance
of counsel were constitutionally sufficient for due process purposes).
84
See, e.g., Marin v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974); Givens v.
Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972); Texarkana Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lewis, 470
S.W.2d 727, 735 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
85
See 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (requiring “effective notice and [an] informal hearing permitting the student to give his version of the events”).
86
582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978).
87
Id. at 101.
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the University of Rhode Island’s standards of behavior. He was informed of the procedures for the disciplinary hearing, which prohib89
ited presence or assistance of counsel. The university appealed the
90
district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction to stop the hearing.
The First Circuit agreed with the district court, concluding that counsel was necessary given the circumstances of Gabrilowitz’s charges and
91
proceedings. In so concluding, the court emphasized the perils facing a student in Gabrilowitz’s situation:
Were the appellee to testify in the disciplinary proceeding, his statement
could be used as evidence in the criminal case either to impeach or as an
admission if he did not choose to testify. Appellee contends that he is,
therefore, impaled on the horns of a legal dilemma: if he mounts a full
defense at the disciplinary hearing without the assistance of counsel and
testifies on his own behalf, he might jeopardize his defense in the criminal case; if he fails to fully defend himself or chooses not to testify at all,
he risks loss of the college degree he is within weeks of receiving and his
92
reputation will be seriously blemished.

Recognizing that courts had not previously granted an absolute right
to counsel in disciplinary proceedings, the court distinguished Gabrilowitz’s situation on the grounds that most disciplinary proceedings
“did not involve the specter of a pending criminal case hovering over
93
the hearing.” Thus the court concluded that an attorney was necessary to protect the student’s rights and the integrity of both the disci94
plinary proceeding and the pending criminal action. The court emphasized the unique challenges confronting a student who faces
disciplinary and criminal charges from the same actions, and concluded that “[o]nly a lawyer is competent to cope with the demands of
an adversary proceeding held against the backdrop of a pending crim95
inal case involving the same set of facts.”
Few courts have followed the First Circuit’s emphatic call for
96
counsel. In 1993, the Seventh Circuit considered the necessity of
88

Id. at 101 n.2.
Id. at 101-02.
90
Id. at 102.
91
Id. at 106.
92
Id. at 103.
93
Id. at 104.
94
Id. at 106.
95
Id.
96
See, e.g., Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying
Goss and Mathews and concluding that cross-examination and counsel were unnecessary for due process); Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 226 (7th Cir. 1993) (“But when
we consider all the factors bearing on [the student’s] claim to a right of counsel, we
89
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97

counsel in Osteen v. Henley. In an opinion by Judge Posner, the court
posited, “Especially when the student faces potential criminal charges . . . it is at least arguable that the due process clause entitles him to
consult a lawyer, who might for example advise him to plead the Fifth
98
Amendment.” But the court ultimately emphasized the difference
between the right to consult counsel and the right to participation of
counsel in the hearing, concluding that Mathews balancing did not re99
quire active participation of counsel. In Flaim v. Medical College of
Ohio, the Sixth Circuit concluded that active participation of counsel
was unnecessary because the hearing was not procedurally complex
100
and the student had admitted the felony conviction. The Sixth Circuit also expressed concern that retained counsel would increase the
101
adversarial nature of the proceedings.
Notably, Congress has explicitly permitted counsel in another type
of school administrative hearing where the proceeding’s outcome im102
plicates similarly significant rights.
Parties in hearings involving
handicapped students under the Individuals with Disabilities Educa103
tion Act (IDEA) have the right to counsel.
Furthermore, if parents
successfully challenge in court the administrative findings about their
child with disabilities and the accommodations to be made, the statute
104
provides for attorney’s fees.
This Comment has so far addressed the right of a student to bring
counsel into a disciplinary hearing, assuming that the student retains
counsel himself. To have a meaningful impact, the right cannot
merely be a right to retain counsel; it must be the right to appointed

conclude that the Constitution does not confer such a right on him. We doubt that
it does in any student disciplinary proceeding.”). But see In re Roberts, 563 S.E.2d 37,
42 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that due process requires the student have the opportunity to have counsel present in long-term suspension cases).
97
13 F.3d 221, 226 (7th Cir. 1993).
98
Id. at 225 (citing Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988)).
99
Id. Active participation of counsel would include direct examination and crossexamination of witnesses, presentation of evidence, and the ability to directly address
the tribunal. Id.
100
418 F.3d 629, 640 (6th Cir. 2005).
101
Id. at 640-41.
102
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h) (2006) (“Any party to a hearing . . . shall be accorded
. . . the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel . . . .”).
103
Id.; see also Edgar H. Bittle et al., Due Process for Students (noting that the requirements for hearings under IDEA differ from other disciplinary hearing requirements under the Constitution), in SCHOOL VIOLENCE: FROM DISCIPLINE TO DUE PROCESS 99, 126 ( J ames C. Hanks ed., 2004).
104
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(B)(i) (2006).
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counsel if the student is indigent. A right that rests on a student’s financial ability to retain counsel would surely deny due process to
many. This would be a right guaranteed only to the rich, and due
process rights must be available to all, regardless of wealth.
II. THE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL: FROM FELONIES
TO CONTEMPT OF COURT
The right to counsel has been widely recognized in American jurisprudence. In an early case assessing the right to counsel, Powell v.
Alabama, Justice Sutherland wrote, “The right to be heard would be,
in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
105
heard by counsel.” That a fair proceeding cannot be accomplished
without the assistance of counsel speaks directly to the dilemma of a
student simultaneously facing a disciplinary hearing and a criminal
tribunal. Such a student requires assistance of counsel to obtain a
fair disciplinary hearing and to protect his rights in the pending
criminal proceeding. An analysis of the applicability of the right to
counsel in disciplinary hearings requires an understanding of the development of this right and subsequent successful and failed attempts
to widen its scope.
A. Criminal Proceedings
As originally intended, it is likely that the Sixth Amendment was
meant only to protect an accused person’s right to retain counsel, not
106
the right to have counsel appointed. The process of creating an absolute right to counsel, retained or appointed, began when the Supreme Court held in Powell that under special circumstances, where
the defendant is unable to retain counsel and cannot adequately present his own defense, the court must assign counsel to comply with
107
due process of law. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held that
there is a constitutional right not just to retain counsel, but to have
counsel appointed in federal court if the defendant is without means

105

287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
See JOHN B. TAYLOR, RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION 50 (2004) (“It is a fair inference . . . that the Sixth Amendment was not
intended to reform existing practice and that it guaranteed only the right to retain
counsel, not the right of a needy defendant to have counsel supplied.”).
107
See 287 U.S. at 71 (“[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ
counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense . . . it is the duty of the
court . . . to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law.”).
106
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108

to retain his own counsel.
In Betts v. Brady, the Court declined to
109
extend this right to defendants prosecuted in state court.
Twenty years after Betts, the composition of the Court had
changed and the Justices embraced the opportunity to reconsider the
110
right to appointed counsel.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court
unanimously overruled Betts v. Brady, using prior reasoning along with
“reason and reflection” to conclude that “any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
111
counsel is provided for him.”
Gideon v. Wainwright secured the right to counsel for persons
112
charged with felonies.
But the question remained open whether
113
there existed a right to appointed counsel for lesser offenses.
Reasoning that the legal challenges of defending against a minor charge
114
can be as complex as defending against a felony, the Supreme Court
concluded in Argersinger v. Hamlin that a defendant could not be imprisoned for any offense, “whether classified as petty, misdemeanor,
or felony,” without the opportunity to be represented by appointed
115
counsel.
The Court applied this actual imprisonment standard in
116
Scott v. Illinois.
In that case, a man was faced with a maximum po117
tential penalty of one year in prison, but actually was fined only $50.
Because his punishment was only a fine, the Court found the assis118
tance of counsel unnecessary.
However, after Scott a state could de-

108

See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938) (“Since the Sixth Amendment
constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a
federal court’s authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.”).
109
316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942).
110
See TAYLOR, supra note 106, at 61 (noting that the Betts dissenters, Justices Black
and Douglas, and two Justices newly appointed the Court, Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan, had expressed the opinion that Betts was wrongly decided and should
be overruled, leading the Court to grant certiorari to Clarence Earl Gideon’s case).
111
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
112
Id. at 33.
113
See TAYLOR, supra note 106, at 69 (summarizing the Court’s approach to right
to counsel in the years following Gideon v. Wainwright).
114
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972) (“Both Powell and Gideon involved felonies. But their rationale has relevance to any criminal trial, where an accused is deprived of his liberty.”).
115
Id. at 37.
116
440 U.S. 367 (1979).
117
Id. at 368.
118
Id. at 369.
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cline to provide counsel for more minor offenses, so long as the judge
119
did not then sentence the defendant to prison.
Questions remained about which offenses guaranteed a right to
counsel, given the panoply of sentences judges could apply in courts
across the country. In Alabama v. Shelton, the Court considered
120
whether a suspended sentence could be imposed or implemented
121
without the assistance of counsel in the original proceeding.
The
Court held that a suspended sentence, which could “end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty,” could not be imposed without
122
providing assistance of counsel.
B. Prison Disciplinary Proceedings
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court concluded that inmates do not
have a right to counsel, either appointed or retained, in a prison disciplinary hearing, even when the charges against the inmate are seri123
ous enough to be prosecuted as a crime.
The Court instead reasoned that it was best to leave the decision about which procedural
elements to afford prisoners to the “sound discretion of the officials of
124
state prisons.”
In Vitek v. Jones, a plurality of the Court did recognize specific circumstances where prisoners have “an even greater need for legal assis125
tance.”
Addressing a case where an inmate was to be moved to a
mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, the plurality
concluded that a prisoner in this situation had a more pressing need
for legal assistance because he likely could not understand or exercise

119

See TAYLOR, supra note 106, at 71 (synthesizing the holdings of the Argersinger
and Scott cases).
120
A suspended sentence is a sentence “postponed so that the convicted criminal
is not required to serve time unless he or she commits another crime or violates some
other court-imposed condition.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1486 (9th ed. 2009).
121
535 U.S. 654 (2002).
122
Id. at 658 (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
123
See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315 (1976) (holding that prisoners are
not entitled to criminal protections in disciplinary hearings because these proceedings
are not criminal prosecutions); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1974) (holding that prison inmates do not have a right to retained or appointed counsel in disciplinary hearings).
124
Baxter, 425 U.S. at 322 (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 569).
125
445 U.S. 480, 497 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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126

his rights.
In that instance, the Court would have held that the
127
Fourteenth Amendment required representation.
There are many similarities between disciplinary hearings in prisons and schools, particularly regarding the rights implicated and the
interests at stake. However, fundamental differences between the parties involved distinguish the two kinds of hearings and suggest that
students should not be constrained by the more minimal due process
protections provided for prisoners. In prison disciplinary hearings,
128
much discretion remains with the prison officials.
The need for
129
specific procedural elements is evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
State statutes can create liberty interests for prisoners, who receive
130
protection under the Due Process Clause.
Such rights have been
found in various prison amenities and in parole and probation; these
rights, however, are generally neither constitutional nor inherent
131
rights.
As such, these individual state-created rights in prison are
distinguishable from education rights.
Restraints on liberty that would be intolerable restrictions of fundamental rights outside of prison can be tolerated in prison if the re132
striction is reasonably related to “legitimate penological interests.”
On the other hand, absolute restrictions on fundamental rights are
133
Students in school discipligenerally intolerable in school settings.
nary proceedings who also face criminal charges are likely juveniles
and objectively comparable to “prisoners who are illiterate and uned-

126

Id. at 496-97.
Id.
128
See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 568 (“[W]e are content for now to leave the continuing
development of measures to review adverse actions affecting inmates to the sound discretion of corrections officials administering the scope of such inquiries.”).
129
See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 321-22 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 569) (concluding that it
is best to leave decisions about which elements are required to the discretion of prison officials).
130
See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 488 (“We have repeatedly held that state statutes may create liberty interests that are entitled to the procedural protections of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
131
See id. at 488-89 (noting that there were state-granted, not inherent or constitutional, rights to good behavior credits, parole, and probation).
132
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that restrictions on inmate
marriages and correspondence were constitutional as they were related to a “legitimate
penological interest”); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (applying
Turner to a due process claim involving involuntary medication of a mentally ill prisoner).
133
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969) (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
127
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ucated” and who “have a greater need for assistance in exercising
134
their rights.”
Finally, an intuitive difference separates prisoners from students.
Prisoners, by their convicted criminal conduct, have surrendered sig135
nificant liberty.
Students, by entering the schoolhouse gates as
mandated by state law, retain constitutional protections, tailored to
136
the “special characteristics” of the school environment.
Accordingly, students should be afforded more procedural protections than
convicted prisoners, including a right to counsel at disciplinary hearings where there are parallel pending criminal charges.
C. Juvenile Proceedings
As briefly noted above, the Supreme Court decided in In re Gault
that a juvenile has a right to assistance of counsel before being com137
mitted to a juvenile home.
This case demonstrates a successful expansion of the right to counsel beyond the realm originally intended
by Gideon v. Wainwright through application of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Gault, the Court concluded that
“[a] proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to
be ‘delinquent’ and subjected to the loss of liberty for years is compa138
rable in seriousness to a felony prosecution.”
Because of the seriousness of this loss, the Court held that due process requires that the
child and his parents be notified of their right to be represented by
retained counsel or to have counsel appointed if they are unable to
139
afford it.
This notification requirement expanded the right to counsel beyond the criminal realm, at the very least in name, because juvenile
proceedings were previously deemed civil actions designed to rehabili-

134

Vitek, 445 U.S. at 496.
See Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (“Many of the liberties and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate
does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration.”).
136
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; see also Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 456
(1995) (“Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere; the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry
cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”).
137
See supra Section I.A.
138
387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
139
Id. at 41.
135
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tate the child, rather than to punish.
Nevertheless, whether the action was termed criminal or civil, the Court emphasized that juvenile
detention constituted incarceration against a person’s will, and thus is
141
“deprivation of liberty.”
A school disciplinary proceeding, unlike a
juvenile court hearing, does not directly threaten loss of liberty, but
does threaten the student’s liberty interest in education and reputa142
tion.
The potential for loss of liberty is particularly high in cases
143
where there is a pending parallel criminal charge as well.
D. Civil Hearings
In 1981, the Supreme Court decided in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services that an indigent woman did not have a right to appointed
144
counsel in a parental rights termination hearing.
This case has
posed a significant obstacle for efforts to establish a right to appointed
145
counsel in civil cases.
In coming to the decision in Lassiter, the majority relied upon
146
consideration of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing factors and a presumption that there exists a constitutional right to counsel only when
147
the party would be deprived of liberty if she lost the case. The Court
concluded that for Lassiter, the Mathews factors did not overcome the
presumption against the right to appointed counsel. Recognizing that
the factors would not always be alike in every case, the Court left the
decision of whether due process requires appointment of counsel to
148
the trial courts.

140

See id. at 15-16 (“The child was to be ‘treated’ and rehabilitated,’ and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather
than punitive.”).
141
Id. at 50.
142
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975) (finding that erroneous misbehavior charges could damage a student’s reputation and future employment and educational opportunities).
143
See infra subsection III.B.2.
144
452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981).
145
See Robert Hornstein, The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases Revisited: The Proper Influence of Poverty and the Case for Reversing Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 59
CATH. U. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (2010) (“[E]fforts to establish a commensurate federal
constitutional right to counsel in civil proceedings for persons unable to afford private
counsel have been weighted down and constitutionally hindered by the Supreme
Court’s 1981 decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.”).
146
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
147
Id. at 26-27.
148
Id. at 31-32.
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A dissent written by Justice Blackmun also employed the Mathews
149
v. Eldridge factors to evaluate Lassiter’s need for counsel.
However,
Justice Blackmun and the Justices joining his dissent opposed the presumption against a right to counsel and concluded that the Mathews
150
factors compelled a right to counsel in Lassiter’s case.
The
Blackmun dissent also disapproved of the majority’s resolution to treat
151
each case individually. Instead, the dissent concluded that the class
of parents facing termination of parental rights, in factually similar
152
situations, should all be treated similarly.
Justice Blackmun emphasized, that “the flexibility of due process, the Court has held, requires
case-by-case consideration of different decisionmaking contexts, not of
153
different litigants within a given context.” Considering that the costs
involved were “relatively slight” and the threatened loss is “severe and
absolute,” the Blackmun dissent concluded that there was a right to
154
counsel in parental rights termination hearings.
A separate dissent
by Justice Stevens went even further: even if the costs were high, Justice Stevens would have found a right to counsel in this category of
155
cases.
Discussing a person’s interest in retaining his or her parental
rights, the majority noted in a footnote that some parents had an additional interest: “Petitions to terminate parental rights are not uncommonly based on alleged criminal activity. Parents so accused may
need legal counsel to guide them in understanding the problems such
156
petitions may create.”
This statement in the Lassiter opinion supports a right to counsel for the class of students this Comment concerns. It suggests that if these students were treated as a class, then
the majority in Lassiter could find that these students need the assistance of counsel in school disciplinary hearings in order to comply
with the dictates of due process. The arguments from Lassiter are

149

Id. at 37-38 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
Id. at 48-49.
151
Id. at 49.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 48. In finding that the costs were relatively slight, Justice Blackmun relied
upon the fact that the State’s role was so “clearly adversarial and punitive,” and that the
right would be limited to parental rights termination cases started by the State. Id.
155
Id. at 60 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“Accordingly, even if the costs to the State
were . . . just as great as the costs of providing prosecutors, judges and defense counsel
to ensure the fairness of criminal proceedings, I would reach the same result in this
category of cases.”).
156
Id. at 27 n.3 (majority opinion).
150
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striking—they constitute the most compelling direct constitutional
support for a right to counsel in school disciplinary proceedings
where the student faces criminal charges arising from the same facts.
E. Civil Contempt Hearings
In the recent case Turner v. Rogers, the Supreme Court addressed
the necessity of appointed counsel in a civil contempt proceeding that
157
could have led to the indigent defendant’s incarceration. In analyzing the question presented, the Court reviewed its previous decisions
158
on both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel.
The Court then analyzed the question under the Fourteenth Amendment framework from Mathews v. Eldridge, after having noted that “the
159
Sixth Amendment does not govern civil cases.”
Given the paucity of cases directly concerning the right to counsel
in civil matters, the Court found the application of its previous decisions unclear. Mentioning In re Gault, Vitek, and Lassiter, along with
Gagnon v. Scarpelli—which denied an ordinary right to counsel at a
160
probation revocation hearing —the Court reasoned that the precedents were best read as “pointing out that the Court previously had
found a right to counsel ‘only’ in cases involving incarceration, not the
161
existence of a right to counsel in all such cases.” Critically, after introducing the right to counsel precedents and noting Lassiter’s pre162
sumption, the Court still analyzed the importance of the interests
163
under Mathews v. Eldridge.
Because the underlying case was a civil proceeding, the Court analyzed “the ‘specific dictates of due process’ by examining the ‘distinct
factors’ that this Court has previously found useful in deciding what
specific safeguards the Constitution’s Due Process Clause requires in
164
order to make a civil proceeding fundamentally fair.”
The Court
then discussed the private interest, the “opposing interests,” and the
157

131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
Id. at 2512-17 (summarizing that an indigent defendant has a right to stateappointed counsel in criminal cases and criminal contempt proceedings under the
Sixth Amendment, and that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has
been read to require state-provided counsel in some civil proceedings).
159
Id. at 2516.
160
411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973).
161
Id. at 2516-17.
162
Id. at 2516-17.
163
Id. at 2517-18.
164
Id. at 2517 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
158
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value of additional or substitute procedures.
The Court found that
these three factors weigh strongly against providing indigents with
counsel in every civil contempt proceeding involving child custody
166
payments.
First, the critical question in determining the indigent
defendant’s potential for incarceration is determining his or her abil167
ity to pay child support.
This is similar to an indigence determination, and, according to the Court, “sufficiently straightforward” to
168
warrant a decision prior to providing counsel.
Second, the Court
explained that often both parties in a civil custody support hearing are
169
unrepresented.
Consequently, there is less of a threat of an unrepresented defendant confronting counsel on the opposing side. Finally, the Court acknowledged the availability of “a set of ‘substitute procedural safeguards,’ which, if employed together, can significantly
170
reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty.”
These alternative safeguards include: notice of the importance of ability to pay in
the proceeding, use of a form to elicit financial information, an opportunity to address financial status at the proceeding, and an express
171
finding by the court regarding ability to pay.
In giving weight to
these alternative procedures, the Court noted the government’s “considerable experience in helping to manage statutorily mandated fed172
eral-state efforts to enforce child support orders.”
Given these considerations, the Court concluded that “a categorical right to counsel
in proceedings of the kind before us carry with it disadvantages (in
the form of unfairness and delay) that, in terms of ultimate fairness,
would deprive it of significant superiority over the alternatives that we
173
have mentioned.”
In rejecting automatic provision of counsel, the Court simultaneously cabined hopes of a categorical right to counsel and invigorated
the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of fundamental fairness.
The decision could be read both positively and negatively for those
arguing for a right to counsel in school disciplinary hearings. The
opinion largely ignores Lassiter’s presumption and instead analyzes the

165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id. at 2518-19.
Id. at 2520.
Id. at 2518.
Id. at 2519.
Id.
Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2520.
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particular situation using Mathews. The opinion ultimately relies upon
alternative procedures to refrain from categorically requiring counsel.
Although prudent in theory, in application alternative procedures do
not offer the same protection that counsel would. In the end, the
Court’s fact-and-situation-specific inquiry provides hope that if it is
forced to address the narrow question of whether a right to counsel is
required in a school disciplinary hearing with a parallel criminal proceeding, the Court could analyze the interests and facts and conclude
that counsel is categorically necessary.
*

*

*

Though some efforts to expand the right to counsel outside the
confines of criminal cases have failed (prison disciplinary proceedings, parental termination hearings), some have succeeded ( j uvenile
proceedings, suspended sentences), and some can be declared partial
victories (alternative procedures in civil contempt cases). Furthermore, important arguments can and have been made that Lassiter
174
should be overturned.
Nevertheless, even without overturning the
opinion, Lassiter itself suggests that parallel criminal charges warrant a
different due process treatment and analysis.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AVENUES TO AFFORDING COUNSEL
IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
A. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The most comprehensive and straightforward way to guarantee
counsel for students in a school disciplinary proceeding is via the
Sixth Amendment’s absolute right to counsel—appointed or retained—in criminal proceedings. The obstacles to obtaining this constitutional right for school disciplinary hearings are obvious once one
considers the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
Under current Supreme Court case law, the proceeding itself must

174

See Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and The Right to Free Counsel for Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of
Durham, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 635, 649-50 (2006) (calling for reassessment of Lassiter’s “pinched view of due process” by noting that civil matters such as
child custody hearings can prove to be as liberty-depriving as criminal detentions);
Hornstein, supra note 145, at 1060 (noting an “increasing crescendo of criticism” of
the Lassiter decision).
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subject the party to a possible deprivation of physical liberty; however, a school disciplinary hearing can culminate only in suspension or
176
expulsion, not incarceration.
The Court has expanded the right to counsel in criminal cases,
extending the right to any case in which there is a mere possibility of
177
incarceration.
However, it remains unlikely that this right will be
expanded to include proceedings where there is no direct threat of
178
a deprivation of liberty.
One can imagine that if there were a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in school disciplinary hearings corresponding to criminal
proceedings, the system would be flooded with requests for Sixth
Amendment appointed counsel not only in school disciplinary cases,
but also in numerous other administrative hearings where a stategranted right, like education, could be withheld because of a criminal
179
conviction.
Although this increase in requests for counsel should
have no effect on the determination of the existence of a Sixth
Amendment right, the additional costs imposed consistently weigh in
180
arguments made against extending this right.
One area of Sixth Amendment law that is important to school disciplinary hearings concerns the role of counsel when a student pleads
guilty to the criminal charges he faces. Under the recent Supreme
Court decision Padilla v. Kentucky, a defendant who faces mandatory
175

See supra Section II.A.
A school disciplinary proceeding itself is a civil proceeding and the school does
not have the power of a court to impose incarceration.
177
See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (holding that a suspended
sentence, which could result in imprisonment if probation is violated, cannot be imposed or implemented without representation by counsel).
178
The deprivation of liberty does not occur only through incarceration in a penitentiary. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 481-82 (1980) (plurality opinion) (finding a
right to counsel for an indigent person who was transferred to a civil commitment facility). Justice Powell concurred that assistance was required but might be provided by
appropriately trained nonlawyers. Id. at 500 (Powell, J. concurring in part); see also In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (finding due process requires that a child facing delinquency proceedings that may result in a loss of liberty be notified of his right to counsel if indigent). However, these rights to counsel were not found via the Sixth
Amendment; rather, the Court held that due process requires counsel in these limited
situations. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492-93; In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
179
See Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (And for Pro Se Court Reform), 62
FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1250-52 (2010) (describing the overburdened criminal justice system and arguing that extending the right to counsel to civil actions would only exacerbate the situation).
180
See, e.g., Shelton, 535 U.S. at 668 (“Nor do we agree with amicus or the dissent
that our holding will ‘substantially limit the states’ ability” to impose probation or encumber them with a ‘large, new burden’ . . . .” (internal citation omitted)).
176
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deportation as a result of pleading guilty to an offense has constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel fails to advise
181
him of the deportation risk associated with pleading guilty.
Although the holding was limited to the risk of deportation, the
opinion’s logic could be extended to other near-automatic, and potentially hidden, consequences of a guilty plea, such as civil forfeiture,
loss of the right to vote, or even sex offender registration or expulsion
182
from school on the basis of the conviction.
Following the Padilla
logic, a student’s criminal counsel, whether appointed or retained,
would have a duty to inform him that pleading guilty to the criminal
offense would have consequences in his disciplinary proceeding. Although a reassuring step in the direction of involving counsel in a disciplinary hearing, this situation is limited in a number of ways. First, it
would only apply to a student accepting a guilty plea. Second, it
would only have an effect if the student pleaded guilty before his disciplinary charges had been resolved. Finally, this situation assumes a
judicial extension of the Padilla logic beyond deportation, which is far
183
from guaranteed.
As desirable as a Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be in
school disciplinary cases to ensure fairness and protect the student in
the subsequent criminal proceeding, the reality of the Supreme
Court’s formulation of this Sixth Amendment right effectively precludes its application to civil school disciplinary proceedings that carry
no direct threat of depriving the student of his liberty.
B. An Essential Element of Due Process Under
Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing
Courts, and theoretically schools seeking to preemptively comply
with the dictates of due process, use the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis to
determine which procedures are necessary for a disciplinary hearing
184
to comply with the due process.
Mathews requires a court to evalu-

181

See 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (holding that “counsel must inform her client
whether his plea carries a risk of deportation”).
182
See id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s opinion because
“[a]dding to counsel’s duties an obligation to advise about a conviction’s collateral
consequences has no logical stopping point”).
183
But cf. id. (speculating that issues related to an attorney’s failure to warn could
percolate in the lower courts for years).
184
See, e.g., Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2005) (observing that the specific requirements of due process for a school disciplinary hearing “will
vary based on the circumstances and the three prongs of Mathews”); E.K. v. Stamford
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ate several factors: the strength of the private interest; the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest; the government’s interest,
including the burdens caused by additional procedure; and the value
185
that would be added with additional procedures.
In this Section, I
argue that an analysis of those factors suggests that a right to counsel
is an essential element of due process in a disciplinary hearing when a
student faces parallel criminal charges. Although Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services presents obstacles to securing this right, these obstacles are surmounted when a student faces a parallel criminal proceeding that risk being compromised by proceeding without counsel in the
disciplinary proceeding.
1. Dispensing with the Presumption Against Counsel
A significant obstacle to a due process–mandated right to counsel
in these disciplinary proceedings is the presumption against a right to
186
counsel.
Justice Stewart, writing for the five-Justice majority in Lassiter, introduced the presumption against counsel:
In sum, the Court’s precedents speak with one voice about what “fundamental fairness” has meant when the Court has considered the right to
appointed counsel, and we thus draw from them the presumption that an
indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he
may be deprived of his physical liberty. It is against this presumption that
187
all the other elements in the due process decision must be measured.

This presumption against counsel effectively terminated Lassiter’s
possibility of obtaining appointed counsel for her parental rights ter188
mination hearing. But Justice Stewart noted an additional factor to
be considered when seeking to rebut the presumption against the
Bd. of Educ., 557 F. Supp. 2d 272, 276 (D. Conn. 2008) (applying Mathews to determine whether a student’s expulsion proceeding violated due process).
185
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)).
186
The Court in Lassiter asserted that it was drawing upon precedents in invoking a
presumption against counsel. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). In
his dissent, Justice Blackmun disagreed that the precedents supported such a presumption at all: “Indeed, incarceration has been found to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for requiring counsel on behalf of an indigent defendant.” Id. at 40
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun then pointed to the deprivation of physical
liberty did not require counsel in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973), and
where counsel was required though no new incarceration would result in Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980). Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 40-41 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
187
452 U.S. at 26-27.
188
See id. at 31-32 (refusing to say that the Eldridge factors will overcome the right
to counsel in every parental termination proceeding).

MOSSMAN_REVISED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

616

12/10/2011 9:44 AM

[Vol. 160: 585

right to counsel, writing, “Some parents will have an additional interest to protect. Petitions to terminate parental rights are not uncommonly based on alleged criminal activity. Parents so accused may
need legal counsel to guide them in understanding the problems such
189
petitions create.”
The four dissenting Justices disagreed with the majority’s analysis
and emphasized that precedent instead favored “adoption of differ190
ent rules to address different situations or contexts.”
The dissenters did not think that the case law supported a presumption against
191
counsel when there was no possibility of a loss of liberty.
The dissent disapproved of generalizing a presumption against counsel, emphasizing instead the importance of a “flexible approach to due pro192
cess.”
The Brennan dissent thus would have inquired into “the
interests on both sides” and the need for counsel in the “specific type
193
of proceeding” involved.
There is wide support for a civil right to counsel. The American
Bar Association (ABA) called for a civil right to counsel in proceed194
ings where “the most basic human needs are at stake,” hoping that
the Supreme Court would eventually reconsider the “cumbersome
Lassiter balancing test and unreasonable presumption that renders the
195
test irrelevant for almost all civil litigants.”
Scholars have analyzed
196
this presumption against counsel and the shortcomings of Lassiter.
Even members of the Lassiter majority were wary of the breadth of the

189

Id. at 27 n.3.
Id. at 37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.); see also
id. at 59-60 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (agreeing with the conclusion of the Blackmun
dissent and adding that “the issue is one of fundamental fairness, not of weighing pecuniary costs against the social benefits”).
191
Id. at 40 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
192
Id. at 41.
193
Id. at 42.
194
Task Force on Access to Civil Justice et al., Am. Bar Ass’n Report to the House of
Delegates, 2006 RESOLUTION 112A, 12, available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/
Documents/1154019065.09/06A112A.pdf.
195
Id. at 6.
196
See, e.g., Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed Is, Once Again, Justice Denied: The Overdue
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 59, 63 (2007) (criticizing the presumption against counsel as “particularly disturbing”); Hornstein, supra note 145, at
1063 (“I argue that due process remains a viable, constitutional basis on which to
ground a civil right to counsel and that the Court should reconsider and overrule its
1981 decision in Lassiter.”).
190
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197

presumption against counsel.
Justice Powell, who joined Justice
Stewart’s opinion in Lassiter, had previously expressed qualms over the
restriction of liberty requirement for a right to counsel, cautioning in
his concurrence in Scott v. Illinois that “the drawing of a line based on
whether there is imprisonment (even for overnight) can have the
practical effect of precluding provision of counsel in other types of
198
cases in which conviction can have more serious consequences.”
Criticism of the presumption against counsel established in Lassiter
focuses on unfairness and misuse of precedent. The dissent in Lassiter
observed that restriction of liberty had not previously been a decisive
factor in determining whether a defendant had a right to counsel,
commenting that “[t]he prospect of canceled parole or probation,
with its consequent deprivation of personal liberty, has not led the
Court to require counsel for a prisoner facing a revocation proceed199
ing.”
And although there is no new threat to liberty when an incarcerated inmate faces transfer to a mental hospital, a plurality of the
200
Court in Vitek v. Jones required counsel. In Goss itself, the Court evaluated the necessity of counsel instead of presuming from the beginning that counsel was unwarranted because there was no threat to lib201
erty. And critically, the presumption against counsel undermines the
202
case-dependent analysis endorsed in Mathews v. Eldridge.
203
Although it is unclear what today’s Supreme Court would do,
there is scholarly support for dispensing with the presumption against
197

See Hornstein, supra note 145, at 1094 (analyzing Justice Powell’s personal papers from Lassiter and concluding that he still harbored concerns originally expressed
in Scott v. Illinois).
198
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Hornstein, supra note 145, at 1092-1098 (illuminating the background considerations and
motivations of the Justices in arriving at the Lassiter decision).
199
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 40 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 408 U.S. 778, 785-89 (1973)); see also Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
200
445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980); see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 40-41 (discussing Vitek in repudiating the presumption against counsel) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
201
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (declining to construe the Due Process Clause to afford counsel in all cases where a student faces a short suspension).
202
See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 41 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today
grafts an unnecessary and burdensome new layer of analysis onto its traditional threefactor balancing test.”).
203
The closest indicator of what today’s Court would do is Alabama v. Shelton, 535
U.S. 654 (2002), where the members of the 2002 Term’s “liberal” wing ( J ustices Breyer, Ginsberg, Souter, and Stevens) were joined by Justice O’Connor to hold that a suspended sentence triggers the right to counsel. Given the changed makeup of today’s
Court, it is unclear, and somewhat unlikely, that the Court would be supportive of fur-
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204

counsel.
Even dicta in the Lassiter opinion suggest that the presumption would have a greater chance of rebuttal if there were also
205
criminal charges.
Whether by overruling Lassiter’s presumption
against counsel or by rebutting the presumption with the seriousness
of the interest at stake, the presumption should be overcome when a
student faces disciplinary and criminal proceedings stemming from
the same incident.
2. A Class Requiring Counsel Under the Mathews Analysis
Once Lassiter’s presumption against counsel is dispensed with, or
at least called into question, a straightforward analysis of the Mathews
factors suggests that students facing disciplinary and criminal charges
stemming from the same event should be constitutionally guaranteed
counsel. Although the Court often cautions that each situation
should be treated on a case-by-case basis, this case-by-case inquiry
206
should analyze each context, not each individual litigant’s situation.
This analysis would consider the interests of students charged with violating both a school disciplinary code and criminal law, such that the
student faces a possibility of incarceration if found guilty of the crimi207
nal charges.
Students facing this situation require the assistance of
counsel because of (1) the urgency of the interests at stake, (2) the
schools’ interests in resolving disciplinary matters in a fair and efficient way, and (3) the value that assistance of counsel would add to
the proceeding in order to protect against erroneously disciplining
these students and compromising criminal proceedings.
The student’s interest in this case derives not only from the threat
to his liberty posed by the criminal proceeding, but also the threat to
his education by the disciplinary hearing. A student confronting par-

ther expanding the right to counsel, even if it did so on due process rather than Sixth
Amendment grounds.
204
See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 145, at 1093-94 (arguing that the presumption of
counsel misconstrues precedent).
205
See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 n.3 (clarifying that when a parent also faces criminal
charges, there is an additional interest to protect that may require assistance of counsel).
206
See id. at 49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The flexibility of due process, the Court
has held, requires case-by-case consideration of different decisionmaking contexts, not of
different litigants within a given context.”); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
339-45 (1976) (distinguishing disability recipients as a class from welfare recipients);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (treating welfare recipients as a class).
207
Thus this approach treats these students as a class for the purpose of due process analysis, rather than conducting such analysis for each individual student facing
these circumstances.
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allel disciplinary and criminal proceedings usually faces a long suspension, if not expulsion, from the school because of the severity of
208
the charges giving rise to the dual proceedings.
Courts have emphasized the seriousness of expulsion because it prevents the student
from studying at that particular institution and may also “prejudice
209
the student in completing his education at any other institution.”
Charges of misconduct might “seriously damage the students’ standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with
210
later opportunities for higher education and employment.”
The
mere accusation of misconduct disrupts a student’s studies and may
211
be emotionally draining and traumatic.
Indeed, a child or young
adult facing serious disciplinary charges can hardly be expected to
“exercise cool judgment, to think clearly, to question effectively, or to
212
testify helpfully.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 recognizes these difficulties in making a juvenile proceed in court alone, allowing a
juvenile to sue or defend against a suit only with a representative, next
213
friend, or guardian ad litem.
This rule acknowledges that in court
proceedings juveniles have special needs where adults do not.
Beyond serious educational consequences, the student has an additional interest to safeguard. Because these particular disciplinary
charges are based on or parallel to criminal activity, the student has a
strong interest in protecting his rights for the criminal proceeding.
Similar to parents facing parental rights termination petitions based
214
on criminal activity, students require the assistance of counsel to
guide them through complicated issues of criminal procedure and
evidence implicated by their testimony at the disciplinary hearing.
One such issue is mounting a defense without making selfincriminating statements that would be admissible in a later criminal

208

See, e.g., Policy Regarding Use of Illegal Drugs and Alcohol, supra note 2 (“Any student found to have sold, manufactured, distributed, or administered illegal drugs may
be suspended or expelled.”).
209
Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
210
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975).
211
See Berger & Berger, supra note 14, at 341 (describing a student’s discomfort
and tension in facing his accusers in front of a hearing body).
212
Id.
213
See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c) (explaining that unrepresented minors or those
deemed incompetent may sue by a next friend or a guardian ad litem).
214
See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 n.3 (1981) (“Petitions to terminate parental rights are not uncommonly based on alleged criminal activity. Parents
so accused may need legal counsel to guide them in understanding the problems such
petitions may create.”).
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215

proceeding.
If, in order to conclude his disciplinary hearing, the
student admits all or some responsibility for the alleged transgression,
this could be introduced as a party admission against the student in
216
his criminal proceeding.
The gravity of the student’s interest in
avoiding possible educational and criminal consequences of the hearing is undoubtedly very significant.
Schools also have several interests at stake in the disciplinary proceedings. Schools have a pressing need to remove students who are
disruptive or dangerous to the school community and the academic
217
process. They must be able to do so without unreasonably large fis218
cal and administrative burdens.
Schools also have an interest in
219
minimizing formal judicial presence in academic decisions.
More
official hearings weaken the beneficial aspects of retaining informality
within the academic community, like strong faculty-student relation220
ships and academic discretion.
Furthermore, some schools see the
disciplinary process as an “instructional vehicle allowing students to
gain wisdom and better judgment from their mistakes” that the in221
volvement of lawyers would disrupt.
The advantages of maintaining less formal procedures in order to
preserve academic discretion decrease as the hearing moves from
strictly academic misconduct, such as cheating or failing, to alleged
222
criminal misdeeds.
An academic decision hinges on academic discretion and experience, while disciplining behavior relies less on the
215

See VACCA & BOSHER, supra note 30, at 222 (explaining that testimony given by a
student in a disciplinary hearing can later be used in the criminal proceeding).
216
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
217
See, e.g., Draper v. Columbus Pub. Sch, 760 F. Supp. 131, 133 (S.D. Ohio 1991)
(noting the state’s interest in “maintaining safe, orderly, and effective public schools”).
218
See Biliski v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 574 F.3d 214, 221 (3d Cir.
2009) (evaluating the school district’s interest under the Mathews framework and finding that the school must be able to act without “disproportionate” burdens); Newsome
v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 925-26 (6th Cir. 1988) (using the Mathews
framework to find that granting an accused student the right to cross-examination at a
disciplinary hearing would impose a heavy burden on school officials that “simply outweighs the marginal benefit” to the student).
219
See Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 88 (1978) (“A
school is an academic institution, not a courtroom or administrative hearing room.”).
220
See id. at 90 (explaining the benefits of more informal procedures in a dismissal
for academic deficiencies).
221
Berger & Berger, supra note 14, at 340; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583
(1975) (reasoning that making a hearing more formal “destroy[s] its effectiveness as a
part of the teaching process.”).
222
See id. (distinguishing a dismissal for academic reasons, which is an academic
judgment, from a dismissal for disciplinary reasons, which is more fact-dependent).
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experience and judgment of administrators and more on factual findings and determinations of credibility, especially in cases of criminal
223
misbehavior.
Since the sanctions available for serious disciplinary
charges are greater, the “informal give-and-take between student and
disciplinarian” required by Goss necessarily increases to a more formal
224
level with a more formal hearing and greater procedural safeguards.
Schools can no longer look at the disciplinary process as a way for students to learn from their mistakes because important liberty interests
are at stake. Because due process likely already compels a more formal
hearing when the student faces the penalty of a long suspension or expulsion, allowing counsel to be present at the hearing does not impose
burdensome additional costs. Although schools may believe that lawyers will make the hearing more contentious, formal, and lengthy, the
lawyer’s presence could actually be helpful in resolving the issues by
negotiating a compromise or securing a deferral of the disciplinary
225
charges until after the criminal proceedings have concluded.
Schools also have an interest in avoiding the costly fiscal burdens
of providing counsel. Though requiring appointed counsel for those
unable to retain counsel for disciplinary proceedings could present a
significant expense for schools, there are solutions that would mitigate
226
this cost, as discussed in Part IV.
The presence of lawyers, rather
than impeding these hearings by making them more formal, could actually prove to be helpful. The interest of the school, though significant, is not as weighty as the liberty interests of the student.
The value that counsel would add to the proceeding is extremely
great. Counsel protects the student’s rights and guards against erroneous deprivation of either the student’s education, by expulsion, or
liberty, by compromising the criminal proceeding. The risk of erroneous deprivation hinges on the choices a student would make at the
hearing without the assistance of counsel. If the student does not
227
speak to avoid self-incrimination, then he risks losing his degree. If
the student speaks, he risks self-incrimination and possible future
223

Compare Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90 (addressing issues in academic hearings), with
Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 641 (6th Cir. 2005) (evaluating the need for
more process as issues of fact and credibility arise).
224
See Goss, 419 U.S. at 583-84 (describing the minimum procedure required for a
ten-day suspension).
225
See Berger & Berger, supra note 14, at 343 (“A lawyer’s presence may be helpful
rather than disruptive in bringing about compromise.”).
226
See infra notes 252-57 and accompanying text for suggestions on how a school
could find low-cost resources to provide counsel to those unable to afford it.
227
Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 1978).
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228

incarceration.
The student here must balance the loss of a degree
229
or education against the possible loss of liberty, deemed by the Su230
preme Court to be of the utmost importance. Without counsel, the
student is faced with the dilemma of whether to mount a defense at
the disciplinary hearing.
A lawyer’s utility in this situation is obvious. Only a lawyer can
“cope with the demands of an adversary proceeding held against the
231
backdrop of a pending criminal case involving the same set of facts.”
A lawyer can advise his client when to remain silent and how to question witnesses to expose the true events or a witness’s motivations in
accusing him. A lawyer is more attuned to the potential for bias in the
232
hearing panel than a student. Perhaps more importantly, a lawyer is
better suited to negotiate with administrators in order to have the disciplinary hearing postponed or perhaps settled altogether than a
233
young, emotional student.
As compelled by Mathews, the interests of the student, those of the
government (the school), and the value of the procedure are weighed
against each other to determine whether counsel is necessary when a
student faces a disciplinary proceeding and criminal proceeding
234
stemming from the same events. Given the strength of the student’s
interest in this situation, the lack of overwhelming inconvenience to
the school, and the value added to the disciplinary proceeding by allowing counsel, due process mandates that students who face these
charges be afforded counsel.
3. Requiring “Alternative Procedural Safeguards” in Lieu of Counsel
At the very least, students facing disciplinary sanctions and criminal charges arising from the same actions should receive “alternative
228

Id.
Id.
230
See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (finding the threat or possibility of deprivation of liberty as a situation necessitating counsel); Lassiter v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S 18, 26 (1981) (hinging the right to counsel on the potential for
deprivation of liberty).
231
Id. at 106.
232
See, e.g., Brewer v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. 779 F.2d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 1985)
(suggesting that sometimes a school official’s involvement could create bias, precluding an impartial hearing).
233
See Berger & Berger, supra note 14, at 343 (discussing the ability of a competent
lawyer to reach settlement and how this would be beneficial to both the student and
the school).
234
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
229
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procedural safeguards,” as did the indigent defendants facing civil
235
contempt in Turner v. Rogers.
If a blanket protection of counsel
cannot be obtained, then alternative procedural safeguards can protect against some of the undesirable consequences previously mentioned. The alternative procedural safeguards for disciplinary proceedings would differ from those suggested in Turner. Schools could
be required to issue a notice to the student that anything they say in
the disciplinary proceeding could be admitted into evidence against
them in the criminal proceeding. Schools can be required to put in
place a mechanism by which the disciplinary proceeding cannot begin
236
until the criminal one has concluded.
Although a student may not
obtain the best representation of his or her interests without counsel,
these alternative procedural safeguards would do something to protect against the greatest threats to the student’s liberty interests.
IV. NONCONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY AVENUES: WHAT A “FAIR-MINDED
SCHOOL PRINCIPAL” WOULD IMPOSE
In Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court held that mere notice and an
opportunity to present the student’s side of the story were necessary
237
for a ten-day suspension to comply with due process.
In doing so,
the Court observed that these procedures were “less than a fairminded school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid
238
unfair suspensions.”
Thus the Court in Goss hinted at the most effective way to ensure fairness and compliance with the Due Process
Clause: school disciplinarians should voluntarily introduce more procedures to ensure fairness and accuracy in disciplinary actions. Undoubtedly, the addition of counsel would help to ensure such fairness;
however, the fiscal and administrative burdens of ensuring counsel
can discourage schools from initiating such action. But there are
pressing reasons beyond compliance with constitutional due process
for schools to implement counsel for disciplinary proceedings where
the student also faces criminal charges. Furthermore, the burdens are
misperceived. There are feasible ways to implement counsel in
235

131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519-20 (2011) (finding that the government should employ
safeguards designed to reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty such as
providing adequate notice and a fair opportunity to dispute factual findings).
236
However, this presents a problem, discussed infra note 269 and accompanying
text, that schools must maintain safe academic atmospheres, which means removing
potentially dangerous students from the classroom.
237
419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).
238
Id. at 583.
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schools that minimize the costs and lessen the formalization that some
fear would accompany the guarantee of counsel.
A. Voluntary Implementation of the Right to Counsel in Schools
The easiest, non-court-mandated way to ensure that students facing criminal charges have counsel in their disciplinary hearing is a system-wide provision of counsel throughout public secondary schools
and universities. Many universities already allow students to bring a
retained attorney or advisor to the disciplinary hearing via provisions
239
in their school disciplinary codes.
And those schools that do not
explicitly allow counsel may allow it in extraordinary situations.
However, this does not account for students who are unable to afford retained counsel or who attend those universities that explicitly
240
forbid counsel or outside advisors.
Schools that do not allow counsel inevitably point to the costs involved in permitting counsel at hear241
ings.
There are numerous reasons, however, to allow counsel in a
disciplinary hearing beyond fundamental fairness. There are also
ways a school could implement use of counsel that would not overly
formalize the process or impose excessive costs.
One reason to implement the right to counsel is to reduce litiga242
tion, which arises with some frequency over disciplinary hearings.
Students contest the hearing elements in these lawsuits, most often
243
alleging constitutional deficiencies in federal courts, vary according
to the school involved, the student, and the situation. But these lawsuits have one thing in common. When a student files a complaint

239

See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
See supra note 67.
241
See Berger & Berger, supra note 14, at 340 (pointing to reasons to refrain from
allowing counsel, including delay, contentiousness, an aggressive litigation stance, insensitivity to the academic atmosphere, and a possibility that, due to the increased adversarial nature, codes would be underenforced).
242
Although there are forces working against a student filing a lawsuit against a
school, see supra note 13, it is clear that these lawsuits do get filed with some frequency.
See, e.g., Coronado v. Valleyview Pub. Sch. Dist. 365-U, 537 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2008);
Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005); Jennings v. Wentzville R-IV
Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1118 (8th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419 (7th Cir. 1997);
Bogle-Assegai v. Bloomfield Bd. of Educ., 467 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D. Conn. 2006); Murphy v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 2d 569 (N.D. Tex. 2003); Riggan v.
Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 86 F. Supp. 2d 647 (W.D. Tex. 2000); Donohue v.
Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
243
See supra note 50.
240

MOSSMAN_REVISED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

A Student’s Right to Counsel

12/10/2011 9:44 AM

625

244

with at least some facial merit, the school is subjected to a process of
motions, discovery, and potentially a trial. Compared with the costs of
allowing counsel in the disciplinary process, the costs—administrative,
reputational, and monetary—of defending against a lawsuit are sub245
stantially higher.
Although allowing counsel does not provide a
complete guarantee that a lawsuit will not occur, it would reduce the
likelihood of contention over commonly litigated procedural ele246
ments such as adherence to the university’s own procedures and in247
sufficient cross-examination.
Furthermore, a lawyer’s role in looking out for the interests of the student at a hearing, like defense
counsel’s role in a criminal proceeding, “keep[s] the process ‘honest,’
thereby lowering the risk that prosecutors in their zeal, or judges
through inadvertence or error, will make mistakes that taint the out248
come.” Since the decisionmakers in hearings—faculty or fellow students, for example—are usually neither legally trained nor involved in
academic administration, they are more prone to error than prosecutors and judges.
While allowing some participation of counsel introduces additional cost, the financial burdens have not been too great for the significant number of schools already allowing counsel to participate in
249
hearings.
Requiring all schools to implement a right to counsel in
244

The complaint would require sufficient merit to survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, which is accomplished when a student sets forth facts that he
was subject to a disciplinary proceeding in a publicly funded university. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (articulating the standard for surviving a motion to
dismiss, which is that a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter” such that the
claim for relief is “plausible on its face”).
245
See Marcus Rayner, Op-Ed, The High (and Hidden) Costs of Lawsuits Against Local
Governments, NJ SPOTLIGHT (May 26, 2011), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/11/
0525/2157 (explaining that the crippling costs municipalities face in defending
against lawsuits affect taxpayers via increased property taxes).
246
See Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1972) (considering whether
departures from hearing procedures established by a university code constitute a denial of due process); see also Berger & Berger, supra note 14, at 342 (“[Counsel] will
compel the school to adhere to its own procedures that benefit his client and challenge those procedures that are prejudicial.”).
247
See, e.g., Flaim, 418 F.3d at 641 (concluding that since there was no issue of credibility, cross-examination would not have added value); Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch.
Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 925-26 (6th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the burdens of crossexamination to the school outweighed the benefits to the student).
248
Berger & Berger, supra note 14, at 342.
249
See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also Berger & Berger, supra note
14, at 344 (suggesting that the fact that sixty percent of schools the authors surveyed
allow counsel implies that these schools have found the practice feasible to implement
and maintain).
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their codes could be done without excessive costs to the institution.
Furthermore, allowing students to bring counsel would not require
the school to similarly “lawyer up.” In many cases, the school’s legal
250
counsel is already involved, even if only peripherally. And any additional time or resources spent on a disciplinary hearing due to counsel’s involvement would likely prove worthwhile by increasing fairness,
decreasing the risk of erroneous disciplinary action, and reducing the
251
likelihood of post-discipline litigation.
As a policy matter, it would not be wise to allow those students
who can pay for legal counsel to have counsel at a hearing, while
denying counsel to students who cannot afford it. There are untapped resources to aid students seeking counsel if they cannot afford
their own or to alleviate financial constraints for universities seeking
to provide counsel in hearings.
For students facing both disciplinary and criminal charges in an
area with a law school nearby, a network of law school students and
professors could be established to provide pro bono advice or representation. Law schools could set up programs where law students with
some training volunteer their time to represent students in disciplinary hearings at public schools in the community. New York University Law School has already set up one such organization: the Suspension Representation Project trains and assigns law students to
represent students in New York City public schools at suspension hear252
ings.
By pairing new student advocates with seasoned ones, the organization allows law students to develop valuable legal skills while
helping to safeguard the public school students’ right to an education
in schools with some of the city’s “most punitive disciplinary poli253
cies.”
This would guarantee that those unable to retain their own
preferred counsel would still benefit from the experience of someone
254
with legal training.
250

Berger & Berger, supra note 14, at 343 (“[T]he rules do not prevent the school
from turning for advice to its own Office of Legal Counsel, and we know that such
contact often occurs. Counsel may not formally appear; yet she is only a telephone
call away.”).
251
Although we are considering extraconstitutional reasons for implementing
counsel, constitutional constraints are always in the background binding the schools’
actions. This increased cost-benefit tradeoff echoes the Mathews factor analysis.
252
See Suspension Representation Project, NYU LAW, http://www.law.nyu.edu/
studentorganizations/suspensionrepresentationproject/index.htm (last visited Nov.
15, 2011).
253
Id.
254
There is, of course, a chance that overeager law students could make disciplinary
proceedings even more quasi-judicial. However, law students frequently volunteer their
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Alternatively, public schools and universities could maintain the
names of local counsel willing and able to volunteer their time to rep255
resent students in a pro bono capacity. Given the encouragement of
256
pro bono service by law firms and the ABA, one would expect some
lawyers to volunteer their time to this worthy and low-commitment
257
representation.
When it comes down to it, if a school plans to conduct a fact-finding disciplinary hearing and allow counsel, that school
would likely incur more costs. But this will only be necessary when
more is on the line—for example, expulsion or long suspensions accompanying serious charges.
With the increased use of counsel, disciplinary hearings will inevitably become more formalized. A student who might have testified
without advice of counsel could refuse to put forth his side of the story, in an effort to preserve his right against self-incrimination in advance of the criminal prosecution. A student who might not have
otherwise cross-examined his accusers will now use counsel to crossexamine, or at least have counsel advise him how to cross-examine.
Greater formalization produces a fairer determination and avoids
jeopardizing the student’s position in criminal prosecution.
Schools could create safeguards to ensure that the presence of
lawyers does not overly formalize the proceeding. For example, a
university could establish informal rules that allow hearsay, permit
admission of otherwise judicially inadmissible evidence, maintain a
258
lower standard of proof, or allow only the hearing panel, rather
than the student or attorney, to question the witnesses. Schools could
limit counsel’s involvement to the role of an advisor, which would
provide some protection of the student’s rights without introducing
courtroom procedures such as cross-examination and opening argutime successfully representing clients in various administrative hearings, such as child
custody and unemployment compensation hearings. See Student Groups, PENN LAW,
http://www.law.upenn.edu/pic/students/groups.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
255
Berger & Berger, supra note 14, at 343-44.
256
See THE ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON PRO BONO & PUBL. SERV., SUPPORTING
JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S LAWYERS 7-8 (2005), available
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/probono_
public_service/report_2011.authcheckdam.pdf (explaining the continuing need for
pro bono legal services for the poor).
257
In most cases, the only commitment required of the attorney would be attendance at the hearing and minimal participation, should the need arise.
258
See Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 85 (1978) (noting that the decision to expel a student must be “careful and deliberate”). However,
this forgiving standard does not preclude a school from using a preponderance of the
evidence or a “more likely than not” standard.
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ments directed at the hearing body. But, just as the greater severity of
the cases considered by this Comment justifies the additional cost,
proceedings should be more formalized when a school subjects a student to a disciplinary hearing while criminal charges remain pending.
Some larger universities maintain several hearing bodies, some of
which resolve minor charges, while others handle the most serious
259
cases.
Some school districts also make accommodations for differ260
ent procedures in the case of charges carrying severe punishments.
Ultimately, it is in the best interests of the school to allow a student the advice of counsel when undergoing both disciplinary proceedings and criminal charges arising from the same events. Universities should seek to resolve the matter in the fairest way, without
subjecting the student to erroneous disciplinary action.
B. Addressing Arguments Against Counsel
There are many reasons why allowing counsel could prove to be
burdensome and overly ambitious. There are constitutional arguments against this right, as discussed throughout this Comment.
Some scholars argue that the proponents of civil counsel cannot overcome the presumption against counsel the Court instituted in Lassit261
er. I believe I have substantially weakened these arguments by showing that given the concerns that arise when a student faces
simultaneous disciplinary and criminal charges the presumption
262
against counsel is reduced or eliminated.
The analysis of the
Mathews v. Eldridge factors illustrates that counsel is required to comply
with due process.
Some argue against a right to counsel in school disciplinary proceedings, expressing concern that the proceedings will become overly
adversarial and that involvement of courts will challenge school ad-

259

See, e.g., Office of Student Conduct, Top Ten Most Frequently Asked Questions,
PENN ST., http://studentaffairs.psu.edu/conduct/faq/top10.shtml (last visited Nov.
15, 2011) (“If there is potential for the assignment of a suspension or expulsion, the
incident will be referred to the University Hearing Board. All other incidents will be
reviewed in an Administrative Hearing.”).
260
See, e.g., SCH. DIST. OF PHILA., supra note 74, at 13-14 (providing different rights
and procedures for short-term suspension, long-term suspension, and expulsion).
261
See Barton, supra note 179, at 1247 (criticizing scholars arguing for a civil right
to counsel because they cannot overcome the presumption against counsel and the
court’s reluctance to mandate counsel).
262
See supra subsections III.B.1 and III.B.2.
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263

ministrators’ ability to maintain order. But, as previously discussed,
the addition of counsel would only apply in the most serious of cases.
These are cases when schools are likely to use the most formal system
available and discipline to according the harshest sanctions permitted.
Furthermore, these hearings are already somewhat adversarial because of the fact-finding tasks of the tribunals. Therefore, the addition of counsel to protect the student only serves to place the student
and the institution on a more equal footing.
Objections to the costs requiring counsel would impose on academic institutions are well taken. However, considering the interests
involved, the mechanisms available to reduce costs, and the money
saved by avoiding litigation, the costs do not pose an insurmountable
obstacle to the right to counsel. As discussed earlier, students facing
disciplinary and criminal charges arising from the same set of facts face
a Catch-22. If they defend themselves at the disciplinary proceeding,
264
what they say could be used against them during the criminal trial. If
265
students remain silent, they will likely receive disciplinary sanctions.
Additionally, the costs of allowing counsel can be reduced by using the services of student-run defense organizations at colleges and
266
universities.
And law school clinics and pro bono organizations,
along with efforts organized by the ABA and similar lawyer-affiliation
groups, could provide pro bono assistance to students unable to af267
ford counsel. These organizations would take the financial pressure
off schools and allow them to provide counsel in serious disciplinary
cases where the student faces parallel criminal charges.
Finally, parents and students often do sue schools alleging that
their due process rights were violated at disciplinary hearings. Allowing the presence of counsel would protect and assert the students’

263

See Edith H. Jones, The Nature of Man According to the Supreme Court, 4 TEX. REV.
LAW & POL. 237, 257 (2000) (“Decisions like Tinker, Goss and Pico have made it more
difficult to maintain order in public schools. Lawsuits, whether filed, threatened, or
merely feared, chill school boards and administrators into temporizing in enforcement
of rules governing discipline and decency.”).
264
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
265
The students will not be punished simply for remaining silent. But if the students do not mount a defense, the charges against them will likely be deemed proven,
and the student will be disciplined for the charges against them.
266
See Kipnis, supra note 1, at 25 (“[T]he allowance of counsel usually fosters the
formation of volunteer organizations, whether run by the students themselves or the
community, that provide disciplinary assistance to accused students.”).
267
See supra notes 252-57 and accompanying text.
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due process rights at the hearing itself, thereby reducing the number
of lawsuits after the disciplinary proceeding.
There is also a concern that the imposition of counsel might prolong disciplinary proceedings and thus prevent schools from removing dangerous students from school immediately. To address this valid objection to requiring counsel, schools could impose a temporary
suspension that would not appear on the student’s record until the
charges are resolved. For example, in situations where a student is believed to be an immediate threat to the school community, the School
District of Philadelphia provides an informal hearing for the stu268
dent.
If it is determined that the student cannot remain in school
269
due to safety concerns, the school provides for an interim assignment.
This procedure would ensure that other students would not be threatened by the presence of a dangerous student, while still guaranteeing
that a student’s right to an education is not unconstitutionally withheld.
As compared to the consequences of not allowing a student the
assistance of counsel in this perilous situation, the costs of allowing
counsel are minimal. The arguments against counsel, though valid,
are significantly less concerning in the factual circumstances this
Comment addresses.
CONCLUSION
Disciplinary sanctions and criminal charges can have potentially
life-altering results. Losing the statutorily guaranteed and widely
upheld right to education has extensive implications for a student’s
life. The Supreme Court has recognized the impact of noncriminal
270
consequences on a person. It is the magnitude of this individual interest and the lack of an interest of similar magnitude on the school’s
side that compel the conclusion that due process requires assistance
of counsel at a disciplinary hearing when a student faces parallel criminal charges. Beyond being constitutionally compelled by due
process, it is highly prudent for a school to provide this procedural
protection. The paucity of court cases directly addressing this question, along with empirical evidence, suggests that many schools al268

See SCH. DIST. OF PHILA., supra note 74, at 14 (“In the event that a student is being considered for expulsion, an informal hearing will be held to determine if the student poses a threat to the school community.”).
269
Id.
270
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (holding that an attorney
must advise his client of the possibility of deportation as a life-altering consequence of
a criminal guilty plea).
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ready recognize the importance of this procedural protection and
271
provide it to students facing this dilemma. It also suggests that, perhaps, many schools only proceed with the disciplinary hearing after
272
the criminal proceeding has been completed.
Nevertheless, a bright-line determination on the constitutional
requirement and prudential advisability of affording counsel in this
situation should be made. Some cases never reach court because of
lack of resources or knowledge on the part of the students. A clear
determination on counsel rights would help these students protect
their rights ex ante. In a society where violence and drug use plague
schools, cases like these become, unfortunately, more and more frequent. It is only by treating the cases fairly and uniformly that we can
be assured that justice has been done and the responsible parties have
been properly sanctioned.

271

See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also Berger & Berger, supra note
14, at 339 (presenting study results that just under sixty percent of schools surveyed
allow counsel).
272
See Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 641 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that
because criminal charges had concluded and the student admitted his felony conviction, neither counsel nor cross-examination was necessary).

